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Abstract
The Information Axiom in axiomatic design states that minimising information is always desirable. Information in design may be considered to
be a form of chaos and therefore is unwanted. Chaos leads to a lack of regularities in the design and unregulated issues tend to behave stochas-
tically. Obviously, it is hard to satisfy the FRs of a design when it behaves stochastically. Following a recently presented and somewhat broader
categorization of information, it appears to cause the most complication when information moves from the unrecognised to the recognised. The
paper investigates how unrecognised information may be found and if it is found, how it can be addressed. Best practices for these investigations
are derived from the Cyneﬁn methodology. The Axiomatic Maturity Diagram is applied to address unrecognised information and to investigate
how order can be restored. Two cases are applied as examples to explain the vexatious behaviour of unrecognised information.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Since the introduction of Axiomatic Design (AD) in
1978 [1], the Axioms are applied to determine the technolog-
ical soundness of a design. The initial number of seven axioms
relatively soon [2] were brought back to a number of two, the
Independence Axiom and the Information Axiom. These two
axioms have been very successful; they are broadly applied for
over 35 years since.
The Independence Axiom and the Information Axiom may
be considered independent from each other [3], however, this
is only the case within the deﬁnition of information as it ap-
plies for AD. ‘Information’ or ‘Entropy’ may be considered as
chaos in design. Information in AD is derived from the infor-
mation technology using a logarithmic measure of Boltzmann’s
entropy according to Hartley [4] and Shannon & Weaver [5]. It
states that information is inversely related to the probability of
success. Probability is the central theme of AD around which
the axioms are carefully wrapped. Knowledge is applied, in
good accordance with the nature of the axioms, to maximise the
probability of Design Parameters (DPs) satisfying Functional
Requirements (FRs). Knowledge is therefore the most impor-
tant enabler to address information and consecutively increase
the probability of a design to function as expected.
Recently, a broader decomposition of information was in-
troduced for AD, that starts with the Information as deﬁned by
Boltzmann, Hartley, and Shannon. The decomposition ends at
the bottom with three kinds of information that directly inﬂu-
ences a product or system design. One of them is ‘Axiomatic
Information’, directly related to the Information Axiom deﬁned
by Suh [6]. Two other kinds of information are ‘Recognised’
and ‘Unrecognised information. Recognised information may
be addressed by making the design independent. Unrecognised
information on the other hand has more mystical traits; it is not
known by the designer and as such it is diﬃcult to address. This
paper investigates how to deal with unrecognised information:
1. how it may be found and 2. when found, how to address
it. Note, when unrecognised information is found, it instantly
changes to recognised information. The research questions for
this paper are:
• How can unrecognised information be found?
• How can recognised information be addressed?
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 focuses on the
background of information and complexity. Section 3 considers
the concept of unrecognised information, how it can be found
and how it may be addressed. Section 4 explains a number of
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cases that deal with unrecognised information, and elaborates
on the concept. Finally, Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings and
conclusions are found in Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Background on Information or Entropy in a Design
Information in Axiomatic Design is derived from the infor-
mation theory using a measure of Boltzmann entropy according
to Shannon & Weaver [5–7]. It uses the logarithmic represen-
tation as introduced by Hartley to make information additive
instead of multiplicative [4]. According to the information the-
ory, information is inversely related to the probability of success
of a goal being met.
Suh describes three types of information in AD, ‘Total’ in-
formation, which consist of ‘Useful’ and ‘Superﬂuous’ infor-
mation [6]. Useful information is information that aﬀects FRs
and their relations to the other domains. Superﬂuous informa-
tion does not aﬀect the relation of FRs and the other domains.
Therefore, superﬂuous information is no information from the
design perspective. Puik & Ceglarek decomposed information
in the axiomatic context as shown in Figure 1 [3]:
• Total information; the total information content or full en-
tropy of the design as deﬁned by Suh [6];
• Useful information; the part of total information that af-
fects the relation between FRs and DPs [6];
• Superﬂuous information; information that does not aﬀect
the relation between FRs and DPs [6];
• Axiomatic information; useful information due to a dis-
crepancy in design ranges and system ranges as will lead
to ‘Real’ complexity[8];
• Unorganised information; useful information that is not
recognised as such due to ignorance of the designer [3];
• Unrecognised information; information of which the de-
signer is not aware of yet [9];
• Recognised information; information of which the de-
signer is aware of but is not addressed yet [9];
2.2. Background on Complexity in Axiomatic Design
Complexity in AD is deﬁned as ‘A measure of uncertainty
in achieving the speciﬁed FRs’ [10]. The Complexity Axiom
advises to ‘Reduce the complexity of a system’. The theory de-
ﬁnes two kinds of complexity, ‘Time-Independent’ and ‘Time-
Dependent Complexity’. In the case of time-independent com-
plexity, the behavior is governed by the given set of FR and DP
relationships. Time-dependent complexity depends upon the
initial condition with FR and DP relationships, but unless the
system goes back to the same set of initial conditions periodi-
cally, the distant future behavior is totally unpredictable as the
system tends to escalate [11]. Time-dependent complexity is
not further investigated in this chapter.
Time-independent complexity consists of two components:
‘Real’ and ‘Imaginary’ time-independent complexity, further to
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Superflous
Information
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functional behaviour
Unrecognised
Information
Recognised
Information
Fig. 1. Overview with types of information and their relations
be referred to as real complexity and imaginary complexity (CR
andCIm). Real complexity is inversely related to the probability
of success that the associated FRs are satisﬁed according to one
of the following relations
CR = −
m∑
i=1
logb Pi (1)
CR = −
m∑
i=1
logb Pi|{ j} for { j} = {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} (2)
depending if the system is uncoupled (Equation 1) or decou-
pled (Equation 2). Relation 1 is under the reservation that the
total probability Pi is the ’joint probability of processes that are
statistically independent’. Relation 2, for decoupled systems, is
modiﬁed to correct for dependencies in the probabilistic func-
tion [10]. b Is in both cases the base of the logarithm, usu-
ally in bits or nats depending of the preferred deﬁnition. Given
1 and 2, real complexity can be related to the information con-
tent in AD, which was deﬁned in terms of the probability of
success of achieving the desired set of FRs[6], as
CR = I (3)
in which CR is real complexity and I is information as deﬁned
in Section 2.1. Imaginary complexity is deﬁned as complex-
ity that exists due to ‘a lack of understanding about the sys-
tem design, system architecture or system behavior’ [11]. It is
caused by the absence of essential knowledge of the system.
The designer cannot solve the problems in a structured manner
and therefore is forced to apply trial-and-error. Imaginary com-
plexity exists until understanding of the problem is acquired; it
instantly and permanently disappears when the knowledge be-
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comes present. Though the source of imaginary complexity,
a trial-and-error process, can be stochastic, Suh never relates
trial-and-error probabilities to information of any kind. The
motive for this choice was not found in Suh’s work; it is ba-
sically a matter of deﬁnition.
2.3. The Complexity Approach of the Cyneﬁn Framework
Cyneﬁn is a decision making framework that can be ap-
plied on organisations, systems, or even complex social envi-
ronments [12]. It was applied, evaluated and reﬁned at the IBM
Institute of Knowledge Management [13] and later expanded to
be used as a leadership model [14]. Cyneﬁn has not yet gained
much drag within the AD community or even product devel-
opment in general, but with the view on information in AD as
reported by Puik & Ceglarek [3,15], both methodologies appear
to connect and harmonise well together.
The framework consists of three basic types of systems; ‘Or-
dered’ systems, ‘Complex’ systems and ‘Chaotic’ systems. Or-
dered systems are divided in to two types: ‘Simple’ ordered
systems and ‘Complicated’ ordered systems. In the centre of
the four contexts is a ﬁfth ﬁeld added: ‘Disorder’. Together this
leads to the Cyneﬁn framework as shown in Figure 2.
• In the simple context, cause and eﬀect relationships are
clear, predictable, repeatable, and generally linear. The
systems in this context are self-evident to every reason-
able person. The decision model of the simple context is
sense-categorise-respond. Good response in these situa-
tions would be to watch what is coming in, match it to
previously determined categories and decide what to do.
The simple context is the context of ‘best practice’;
• In the complicated context, there is a logical relation be-
tween cause and eﬀect, but it is not self-evident and there-
fore requires expertise. An analytical method is needed
to solve problems, or an expert could be called in. The
decision model therefore is sense-analyse-respond. The
complicated context is the context of ‘good practice’;
• A complex system is a system without causality. Cause
and eﬀect are only obvious in hindsight, with unpre-
dictable emergent outcomes. The decision model is probe-
sense-respond. Carrying out experiments is a key charac-
teristic; a successful outcome is enhanced, a bad outcome
is suppressed. Actions lead to a novel way of doing things.
The complex context is the context of ‘emergent practice’;
• A chaotic system shows no relation between cause and ef-
fect. The goal should be to restore order. The decision
model therefore is to act-sense-respond. Actions will be
new and unconventional. This is the context of ‘novel
practice’;
• Disorder is the space when it is not clear to which context
a situation should be appointed.
The boundaries between the contexts are transitions that can
be taken without speciﬁc eﬀects, except for the boundary be-
tween the simple context and the chaotic context. This bound-
ary is referred to as the ‘Complacent Zone’ or the ‘Cliﬀ’. The
danger is that once a system is in the simple context, people
Simple
Sense
Categorise
Respond
Best Practice
Complicated
Sense
Analyse
Respond
Good Practice
Complex
Probe
Sense
Respond
Emergent Practice
Chaos
Act
Sense
Respond
Novel Practice
Dis-
order
Fig. 2. The four contexts of the Cyneﬁn framework. When in disorder, the
actual context is not known
start to believe that things are simple by nature. It may lead to
the belief that things are always ordered and that success from
the past is proof that systems cannot fail. The result is that the
actual position moves to the border and at a given moment falls
over the cliﬀ into a crisis.
2.4. Synergy between Axiomatic Design and the Cyneﬁn
Framework
Although originally from a completely diﬀerent background,
AD and the Cyneﬁn framework have a number of similarities.
First, for both methodologies, knowledge is enabling for the
determination of the status of a system. Secondly, both meth-
ods deal with the level of organisation in systems or contexts.
AD, as was shown in ﬁgure 1, has unorganised information and
axiomatic information, the latter dealing with an organised de-
sign matrix and therefore also to be considered as ‘organised’
information [3].
3. Considerations on Unrecognised Information
3.1. Characteristics of Unrecognised Information
Unrecognised information is a state of chaos in the design
that remains unnoticed by the designer. Though the designer
is unaware of the presence of information in the design, his
design contains true information and the FRs may not be sat-
isﬁed. Unrecognised information is usually the result of a lack
of knowledge of the designer. Typically, this is caused by a DP
that is not recognised. All recognised DPs, that have an eﬀect
on a relating FR, are normally ‘Fixed’ by the designer; the DP
is set at a known value so it will not inﬂuence the FR during
development and use of the product. As a result of the unfa-
miliarity with a DP, also called a hidden DP, it will not be ﬁxed
by the designer. When its value changes in a later stage, it may
dissatisfy the FR and a problem occurs. Though it is possible
that unrecognised information remains in the design because
the designer was negligent to properly investigate the system,
this is usually not the case. Unrecognised information stays
hidden when the hidden DP stays within acceptable margins
and thereby does not (or moderately) interfere with the func-
tionality of the design. Therefore, a design may function quite
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Fig. 3. The Axiomatic Maturity Diagram plots the way a product matures
well with unrecognised information. At the moment that the
DP starts changing, due to some inﬂuence that puts the change
into eﬀect, the functionality of the system will be compromised.
This will normally come as a complete surprise to the designer
as he has no notice at all about the cause of the problem.
What happens when unrecognised information reveals it-
self can be visualised by the Axiomatic Maturity Diagram
(AMD) [16]. The AMD plots the axioms on both axes of a
diagram to monitor progression as the design matures. The
Independence Axiom is plotted on the horizontal axis and the
Information Axiom is plotted on the vertical axis. The devel-
opment line follows the path according to the satisfaction of
the axioms in the design. A safe development path through the
AMD would ﬁrst go to the right side of the diagram and then
bend upwards and move to the dot that indicates a mature de-
sign (Figure 3 left). A concurrent way of development would
cut the lower right corner and could gain development time at
the cost of increased risk [9]. When unrecognised information
is found, it will lead to a discontinuity in the development path
because a correction from the path as supposed by the designer
to the true development path is carried through. The satisfac-
tion of the Independence Axiom could be set back when this
happens (Figure 3 center), or both axioms could be set back
when a conceptual ﬁx needs to be carried through that aﬀects
robustness (Figure 3 right). In the ﬁrst situation the project will
not continue as intended but will in reality follow a new path to
the upper right corner of the AMD. In the second situation the
conceptual ﬁx brings the situation back to the initially aimed
development path.
Finally, a remarkable characteristic of unrecognised infor-
mation is that it only exits in its hidden state. It instantly
changes to recognised information when it is discovered. In
the new presence of recognised information, the designer can
address it by completing and decoupling the design matrix.
3.2. How to Find Unrecognised Information
Finding unrecognised information is a key challenge for
product designers and there is no method that comprehensively
enables this. The product design may be seen as a complex sys-
tem which indicates it is not completely understood. According
to Shannon and Weaver, a system that is not understood may in-
troduce features with a stochastic nature. The stochastic nature
is caused by missing structure of the design that is a requisite to
satisfy the independence Axiom. Gell-Mann & Lloyd call this
missing structure a ‘lack of regularities in the system’. The lack
of regularities increase entropy in the system and ‘the smaller
the entropy, the less spread there will be among the entities that
follow these regularities’ [17, p. 50]. A lack of regularities in
the design will increase its chaotic behavior and thus increase
information. The deﬁnition of well-chosen FRs, the process of
selecting matching DPs, decoupling the relations between FRs
and DPs, making sure that all DPs are relevant, and ensuring
that all relevant DPs are known, are all regularities that con-
tribute to a more predictable behavior of the design and hence
they eliminate information from the design.
As stated at the beginning of this paragraph, there is no
method that comprehensively enables or guarantees the detec-
tion of missing regularities in the design. However, there are
two ways to increase the chance that missing regularities are
found. A product or system will not behave stochastically if all
regularities needed to satisfy the FRs are known:
• The ﬁrst way to deal with missing regularities in design is
found in the application of the Axioms, in particular the
Independence Axiom. If the set of FRs is truly complete
(the FRs are ‘CEME’; collectively exhaustive and mutu-
ally exclusive [18]) and an exhaustive search is done for
all DPs that may inﬂuence the FRs, the chances that the
unrecognized DPs are found is maximal;
• The second way to increase the chance to ﬁnd missing reg-
ularities is described by Kurtz and Snowden [13]. The de-
cision model they propose is to create ‘probes’ to make
potential patterns more visible before taking action. These
patterns then can be sensed and responded to e.g., by sta-
bilizing the patterns that are desirable and by destabiliz-
ing those that are not. Positive patterns may be seeded
to make them more likely to emerge. In the world of the
designer, this approach is very related to physically test-
ing the system. Testing is extremely successful in ﬁnding
missing regularities because ‘people get fooled, but not na-
ture’ [19]
Summarising, it is not possible to guarantee that all regularities
of a system are found but the chance of ﬁnding missing irregu-
larities is maximised when 1. an exhaustive search for FRs and
DPs is performed, and/or 2. the system is exhaustively tested.
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Fig. 4. The options how to act when unrecognised information is found
3.3. What to Do if Unrecognised Information is Found
As explained in §3.1, unrecognised information may remain
hidden in the design till the point that some property puts the
change into eﬀect. From that moment the problem may start
escalating. It is diﬃcult to respond adequately to an escalating
problem because no solution was foreseen to address it. Other
solutions that concern the same FR may work partially or may
not work at all. Another essential point of disengagement to
learn about unrecognised information in a design is the stadium
‘Proof of Concept’. If unrecognised information is found be-
fore this point, before the design matrix is oﬃcially found to be
decoupled, the impact can be overseen. At this stage, it is ‘just’
another problem to address. The design team is at full strength
to deal with this kind of diﬃculties. Diﬀerent is the situation
where the stadium proof of concept is passed. Detection of un-
recognised information sets the project back in the conceptual
phase, no matter if it is detected in the robustness stage or af-
ter the release of the product in the ﬁeld. The product has a
conceptual weakness, some of its design features are not fully
regulated and will behave stochastically. It will lead to inexpli-
cable behaviour of the product or system. Figure 4 shows the
options that apply when unrecognised information is found.
When unrecognized information is found within the concep-
tual development stage, represented by situation ‘A’, it means
more work but this is unlikely to be disastrous; the design team
is equipped with knowledge and tools to solve problems of this
kind and there are still many problems to solve. From the per-
spective of the Cyneﬁn framework of Figure 2, this means that
the transition from Complex to the Complicated context will
require extra eﬀorts. Delay of the project is possible if the un-
recognised information is of serious order.
When unrecognised information is found after the proof of
concept, the impact is more severe. If it is shortly after the tran-
sition to proof of concept, the project status may be set back to
the conceptual stage. If the project already was released, the
problems are substantially bigger. Now, two options apply: ‘B’
shows situation where unrecognised information is found, but
it is not escalating because the hidden DP is still within rea-
sonable margin of its setpoint. There will be time to develop a
solution. A kind of ‘Restrained Panic’ will emerge because the
problem may escalate any time. The development of a solution
will need the reassembly of a design team that has the ability
and is given the time to develop a solution. From the perspec-
tive of the Cyneﬁn framework of Figure 2 it means that a jump
is made from the Simple domain to the Complex domain. When
a solution is found, the design moves clockwise through the
Complicated context back to the Simple context. The other op-
tion is marked with ‘C’. The hidden DP has changed and cannot
be restored. Now the problems get troublesome because func-
tionality of the product is compromised and there is no quick
ﬁx. From the perspective of the Cyneﬁn framework, a con-
ceptual weakness without the knowledge to solve the problem
pushes a project into the complacent zone and over the cliﬀ,
straight into the chaotic context. The only way to get out is to
make the full circle clockwise through all contexts; restore or-
der, eventually with drastic measures, and ﬁnd cause and eﬀect
by reassembly of the design team. From this point, make things
analysable and categorisable again.
4. Two Cases that Deal with Unrecognised Information
Two cases are descried to support the previous theory. Sit-
uation ‘A’, in which the project is still in the conceptual phase
will not be explained in more detail since presence and sud-
den appearance of unrecognised information is usual fare in this
phase. The ﬁrst case describes a situation in which the problem
does not directly escalate. The second case is about a problem
where unrecognised information escalated right away when it
revealed itself.
4.1. An On-Line Payment Application
4.1.1. General
The ﬁrst case concerns a Dutch company that delivers so-
lutions for on-line payments. This store management sys-
tem combines online payments, store payments, and integrates
stock keeping of stores and warehouses in a single solution. It is
a complex multi-mainframe system with many interfaces. The
system may be seen as the core around which the operations of
many stores are organised. If the system goes down, no pay-
ments can be done in both physical and on-line stores.
Because of the importance for the operations to the cus-
tomers, the company gives an up-time guarantee with penalty
clause. Maintenance of the system is done at certain nights of
the week when all stores are closed. Regular updates take place
to add features and to correct malfunctions. Backups are made
to secure data. All this is done over the internet from a single
location in the Netherlands over several thousands of cash reg-
isters in Europe. Security is a signiﬁcant issue; many attempts
to hack the system take place. The company also hires profes-
sional hackers to test the system for vulnerabilities. Since all
systems are connected to the internet there are many interfaces
and even more ports to approach the system.
4.1.2. The problem
At a given day, the ICT manager of the company is hinted by
the one of the professional hackers that a certain interface gives
access to the system because a port is opened. The manager has
this problem examined by the team and they conﬁrm that the
port is opened. This is a necessity to ad certain functionality to
the system. However, the team is convinced that this vulnerabil-
ity is not of a worrisome nature. Some days later, the manager
is not quite comfortable with the situation and in the evening he
tries to get access to the system from his home location. To his
surprise, he is able to gain access without any password and he
is also able to start and stop processes on the mainframes and
even worse, he is able to execute ghost payments.
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4.1.3. The Consequence
The same evening, the manager reports the problem to the
general manager. That same night they try to reconstruct the
origin of the problem. They conclude that the vulnerability has
been there for over six months. Next morning, a crash team is
composed. A risk analysis indicates a severe problem. A few
thousand systems are in the ﬁeld with the same vulnerability.
4.1.4. The Solution
The problem can be ﬁxed; the team has to reroute a number
of communication channels to restore the vulnerability. After
some long days, a ﬁx is completed. It is implemented on a test
system and tested for a week. After this it is rolled out to a
limited number of systems before it is rolled out completely.
4.1.5. Elaboration from the Perspective of Information
In the beginning of this evaluation the vulnerability already
is in the system. There is peace in the company because no
one is aware of the problem. But this calm is unfounded; The
system may be terribly hacked any moment with the result that
the system can be halted or fake bank transfers take place. All
this is caused by the presence of unrecognised information in
the system.
Once discovered, the calmness in the company gives way to
the ‘Restrained Panic’ of the knowledge that anything may go
wrong any moment. This is visualised in Figure 5 with a drop
in the AMD. After this, the engineers concurrently develop a
conceptual ﬁx. The ﬁx needs changes in the software design
which may reduce the robustness of the system. Robustness is
regained by testing the system again. The end position in the
AMD is comparable to the supposed end position before learn-
ing about the unrecognised information but it is more mature
than the true starting point.
In the Cyneﬁn framework, the situation moves from the Sim-
ple context directly to the Complex context. There is no state
of chaos in the company, but all engineers feel the pressure to
understand the situation and come up with the solution. Since it
is a complex system, they need time to ﬁnd that solution. Once
rolling out the system starts, the company comes at ease and
moves via the Complicated context back to Simple.
4.2. Case 2 De Havilland Comet
4.2.1. General
The second case is a case from the history books. It concerns
the De Havilland Comet. Extensive research has been done to
ﬁnd the cause and eﬀect of this case [20,21]. The Comet was
the world’s ﬁrst production commercial jetliner developed and
manufactured by de Havilland. It featured an aerodynamically
clean design with four turbojet engines buried in the wings, a
pressurised fuselage, and large square windows. The plane was
a gigantic step forward in avionics, with cruising speeds up to
800 kmh−1 and cruising altitudes of over 13 000m.
4.2.2. The problem
In 1954 two de Havilland Comets broke up in ﬂight with no
apparent reason known at that time. Because of this, the plane
was grounded.
4.2.3. The Consequence
Investigations were needed to ﬁnd the problem that caused
the two crashes in 1954 and this appeared not easy. The planes
were put in a water basin to test the integrity of the fuselage by
pressurising it. After a number of load changes it ruptured. Fur-
ther investigation learned that fatigue cracks starting at the piv-
ots of the square windows and hatches led to accelerated growth
of cracks. When the cracks became too large, the fuselage rup-
tured, starting at the forward escape hatch and the top hatches
(Figure 6).
Fig. 6. Cracks started at the escape hatches and the windows that both had a
square shape and were pivoted [20]
4.2.4. The Solution
The problem was solved by improving the pivots and the
shape of the hatches and the windows, but it took till 1958 be-
fore commercial ﬂights resumed.
4.2.5. Elaboration from the Perspective of Information
At the beginning of the design, this plane already suﬀered
from the weakness that the shape of the square hatches led to
tension concentrations in the metal. Pivots weakened the fuse-
lage further at the locations with high tension. The wall of the
fuselage was relatively thin to save weight and the combination
of these factors led to the presence of unrecognised information.
When this information came to the surface the problems were
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Fig. 7. In this situation a safe development path is followed, characterised by a
steep incline during the restoration of robustness
diﬃcult to oversee; not only many lives were lost but also the
conﬁdence in the safety of the plane disappeared. Enthusiasm
about a great plane made place for total chaos.
The aircraft crash investigation that followed revealed the
true position in the AMD (Figure 7). The fatigue problem short-
ened the lifespan of the plane, and that FR was no longer satis-
ﬁed. Substantial conceptual improvements were needed which
resulted in a signiﬁcant drop in robustness. The improvements
restored the independence of the system up to a high extent.
The repair cycle ended with restoring the robustness by repeat-
ing the many tests that are required to get the necessary permis-
sions to resume service.
In the Cyneﬁn framework, the situation moves from the
Simple context to the complacent zone and falls over the cliﬀ
straight into chaos. When the fuselage tests were completed
the relation between cause and eﬀect was restored. Based on
that understanding a new start could be made by the De Havil-
land Comet. That restart was successful from the technological
perspective as the fuselages remained intact from that moment.
5. Discussion
Ignorance indeed is bliss, in any case till unrecognised in-
formation presents itself. Finding unrecognised information in
a design, before it is released to the market, is probably the
biggest challenge for the designer. Especially if a design has
many totally new design solutions, it is diﬃcult to be sure that
all unrecognised information is found. Two methods are given
in this paper to address unrecognised information; exhaustive
modelling the design is the ﬁrst and extensive testing is the
other. Methods to address information have been presented
when unrecognised information is found. The Axiomatic Ma-
turity Diagram can be applied to determine the right response
when a designer is confronted with unrecognised information.
5.1. Strengths of this Approach to Deal with Unrecognised In-
formation
The two methods to ﬁnd unrecognised information are not
new. Exhaustive understanding is the basis of AD. The CEME
method for deﬁning FRs, collectively exhaustive and mutually
exclusive, is well known and generally applied within the AD
community. However, this investigation learns that it is also
needed to exhaustively chart all possible DPs that are associated
to the FRs in case. When DPs are not properly ﬁxed, they may
start drifting at some point and cause problems in time.
The Axiomatic Maturity Diagram is still relatively new but
it turns out to be a practical tool for the analysis of problems in
the conceptual phase, because it also shows the impact on the
robustness phase and warns the designer for an eventual loss of
design eﬀorts. Its visual character enables sharing thoughts be-
tween designers of diﬀerent disciplines or managers and tech-
nicians. The analysis makes insistently clear what the results
are when unrecognised information is ignored or sloppy eﬀorts
of the designer make him overlook it.
5.2. Weaknesses and Limitations of this Approach to Deal with
Unrecognised Information
The two methods to ﬁnd unrecognised information, even
when applied in the most conscientious manner, give the de-
signer no certainty that his search was exhaustive. Both meth-
ods are costly; exhaustive modelling is time consuming for
skilled engineers and testing requires realisation of prototypes
or test setups that claims resources and investments. The Ax-
iomatic Maturity Diagram is not yet generally known and could
beneﬁt from more exposure to give it a low threshold for appli-
cation.
A limitation is that a designer is never certain that unrecog-
nised information is properly addressed. Some may reside in
the product design and it cannot be predicted if, and when un-
recognised information rears its ugly head.
5.3. Opportunities for Further Research
An opportunity could be to apply an adapted version of the
method of inventive problem solving (TRIZ) [22]. As is, the
method is able to contribute to the synthesis of solution con-
cepts. It could be modiﬁed that it ﬁnds potential risks when
inventive principles are applied. A quick literature scan learns
that some work has been done in this direction e.g., Regazzoni
& Russo present an improved risk management model for prod-
uct and system design to reduce failure occurrence based on
TRIZ and FMEA [23]. Teoh & Case published a knowledge
modelling procedure based on FMEA that is particularly suit-
able for automation [24].
6. Conclusions
Unrecognised information is a intrinsic problem to product
development. This paper presents two methods to ﬁnd unrecog-
nised information during the product design process. Secondly,
the paper presents a way to visualise the eﬀects when unrecog-
nised information is found. Basically, the appropriate way to
deal with unrecognised information is to go back to the concep-
tual phase of the product design, because this is where this kind
of information intervenes with the product design. As a conse-
quence, it may be the case that the robustness of the design is
aﬀected when unrecognised information is addressed.
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